

IAC-D-100/62
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Validity Study of NIE 92:

Israel, 11 August 1953 and of Other Important Estimates

on Israel in Estimates Prepared Since April 1956*

1. NIE 92 has held up well for the past five years; almost all its conclusions remain valid. However, it overestimated the deterrent effects of US influence in preventing an outbreak of major hostilities between Israel and the Arabs. It did not anticipate the USSR's active involvement in the area.

2. The NIE's involving Israel prepared during the past two years have generally stood up well, except in one significant respect. The SNIE's produced in the fall of 1956, particularly SNIE 30-3-56, SNIE 30-4-56, and SNIE 30-5-56, underestimated the likelihood of Israeli armed intervention in Egypt either alone or in conjunction with Anglo-French military action. While the focus at that time was principally upon British and French activities, a better measurement of Israeli interests and concerns as the Suez crisis developed might have permitted an accurate and earlier judgment regarding Israeli intentions in Sinai.

3. The estimates in NIE 30-2-57, NIE 36.1-57, and SNIE 30-58 in regard to the Arab-Israeli question remain valid.

*The following estimates prepared during the past two years are applicable:

SNIE 30-3-56, "Nasser and the Middle East Situation,"
31 July 1956

SNIE 30-4-56, "Probable Repercussions of British-French
Military Action in the Suez Canal,"
5 September 1956

SNIE 30-5-56, "The Likelihood of a British-French Resort to
Military Action Against Egypt in the Suez Canal,"
19 September 1956

NIE 30-2-57, "Near East Developments Affecting US Interests,"
8 October 1957

NIE 36.1-57, "The Outlook for Egypt and the Nasser Regime,"
12 November 1957

SNIE 30-58, "Prospects and Consequences of Arab Unity
Moves," 20 February 1958